Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1948

Edwin U. Moser v. Zion's Cooperative Mercantile
Institution and John A. Rogers : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
L. E. Nelson; Samuel J. Carter; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Moser v. Zion's Cooperative Mercantile et al, No. 7148 (Utah Supreme Court, 1948).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/817

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

71_48
Case No. 7148

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ERWIN U. MOSER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-

ZION'S COOPERATIVE MERCANTILE
INSTITUTION, a corporation,
and JOHN A. ROGERS,
Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

L.E.NELSON
SAMUEL J. CARTER
Attorneys for Plaintiff __
and Responde·nt
G~

E!.:\, SUPREME CCURT, UTAH

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
page

srr Are Kl\fENT

OF FACTS --------------···--------····················· 1

ARGlTMENT -----·-·························-·-···-·················--·············- 4
NEWL\' DISCOVERED EVIDENCE -·-·····-------- 13, 22
Review of Affidavits for and Against ______________ 14, 16
Review of Cases and Authorities ---·-··------------· 16, 22
INSTRUCTIONS ·--··-··-··-·-·-·····---·-··-···-···--·--------·····- ........ 22
CONCLUSION ··-····-----·----------··--···-···-----·····-----··················· 23
INDEX, CASES AND AUTHORITIES
Haarstrich v. O.S.L. Ry. Co., 70 Utah
552, 262 Pac. 100 ----·-·----·-··---······························ 10. 21
.Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 57 P. 2d. 708 ........ 17
Klqpenstine v. Haws, 20 Utah 45 ·············-····----·······-······ 17
Triplble v. Union Pacific Stages, 105 Utah 457,
142 P. 2d. 674 ·--········-·--·----·-··---····························· 16. 17
Valiotis v. Utah-Apex Mining Co. 55 Utah 151,
194 Pac. 802 ........................................................... ..... 20
Van Dyke v. Ogden Savings Bank, 48 Utah 606,
161 Pac. 50 ...................................... ...................... 16, 19

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ERWIN U. MOSER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vsZION'S COOPERATIVE MERCANTILE
INSTITUTION, a corporation,
and JOHN A. ROGERS,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
7148

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 10, 1945, the date of the accident involved in this case, appellant Rogers left Salt Lake CitY
at approximately 7 :00 o'clock A. M., driving appellant
Z. C. 1\1:. I.'s truck, loaded with between six and seven
tons of groceries (Tr. 339). Mr. Rogers had tire trouble
en route to Logan, and was required to change the tire
himself (Tr. 314). He drove from Salt Lake City .to
Logan, where he delivered part of his load; and made
other deliveries at Smithfield, Richmond, and Lewiston,
in Utah, and at Fairview, Preston, and Franklin, in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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7:30 o'clock P. ~L, so at the time of its occurrance Mr.
Rogers had been working for approximately 12 1-2 hours
(Tr. 155. 340).
At a point on U. S. Highway 91 approximately 66
feet southwesterly of the Blacksmith Fork River bridge
located llh miles southwest of Logan, Utah, appellants'
truck, being driven in a southwesterly direction on said
highway, collided with the automobile of respondent,
which he was there driving in a northeasterly direction
toward Logan. Appellant Rogers was riding alone in
the truck. Respondent was driving his automobile, and
sitting on his right in the front seat was his wife, with
his wife's aunt, Mrs. Coral .Jones, sitting in the rear
seat (Tr. 155).
Exhibit H discloses that the paved portion of the
highway at the point of the collision is 22 feet wide,
and that the shoulders on either side of the paved portion are 8 feet in width. That exhibit further discloses
that the distance between the rails of the bridge is 25
feet.
Appellant Hogers testified that he first saw the
!loser car as he entered the bridge, and that at that
time it was about 300 feet distant (Tr~ 332, 333). Respondent Moser testified that his particular attention
was first called to appellant's truck by a sudden jerking
of its lights as it entered the bridge (Tr. 157). Appellant
Rogers testified he did not collide with the northwest
corner of the bridge as he entered it, but this testimony
is rebutted by that of appellants' witness Reese, who
testified the north end of the bridge had been hit (Tr.
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365), hy

witne~s

Haws ('rr. 289). by witness McMurdie

(Tr. 272), and by witness Hiclanan (Tr. 229). Lt. Day,
a witness for appellants, testified there was debris scattered along the bridge in about the center of the road
(Tr. 313). :Mr. Heese also testified that he "found part
of the bed of this truck strung along the bridge" (Tr.
357). The truck driven by appellant Rogers admittedly
struck the west rail of the bridge (Tr. 323, 344) and
broke off the post embedded at its southern end (Tr.
326). After the collisison the outside right rear dual
tire of the truck was flat, and its connecting rod was
broken (Tr. 290).
Respondent and his wife both testified that at all
times prior to the collision, and at the time of the collision, respondent's auton1obile was on its right side of
the road (Tr. 159, 212). Respondent and his wife further
testified that as appellants' truck left the bridge, and
immediately prior to the accident, it suddenly came
over into respondent's lane, and that its rear end was
whipped around in front of respondent's automobile,
and that the collision occurred in respondent's lane of
traffic (Tr. 158, 210).
After the collision, respondent's automobile was
standing on the highway. Lt. Day, the first person to
arrive at the scene of the accident, testified that the left
front wheel of respondent's automobile "was not over
the center line of the highway more than one foot" (Tr.
312, 313). Lt. Day further testified that the "right rear
wheel was just about off, nearly off the road" (Tr. 316)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cement or pavement" (Tr. 317). The edge of the pavernent referred to was on the right side of respondent's
lane (Tr. 304). Tire marks on the top of respondent's
automobile clearly appear from Exhibits A and B. Respondent identified these tire marks on the top of his
autmnobile (Tr. 192). Exhibits A, B and C disclose that
respondent's car was pulled to the left of the direction
in which it was traveling.
ARGUI\iENT

Wheel Marks of Truck on Right Shoulder of Highway
Appellants in their brief, on page 26, state that
certain physical facts are uncontroverted. This is not
correct, and the following evidence disproves such statement. Mr. Reese testified he saw a tire mark of the truck
which ''led from the edge of the bridge to the right edge
of the shoulder of the road" (Tr. 358). When asked on
direct examination, "Which tire it was, of the truck'
Did you determine that~" he answered, "Well, the front
tire, which showed the best. I wouldn't say it was definite, it was a little dim.'' To the next question, ''On which
side~'' he replied, ''That would be the right front tire
-the right front tire." (Tr. 359). Mr. Gray. another of
appellants witnesses, when asked what tire marks he
saw on the shoulder, replied "The one I seen. it was
a dual wheel track." (Tr. 393). Mr. Gray even testified
that the track on the right was a little deeper than that
on the left (Tr. 394) and this in spite of the fact that
the right dual tire was flat. Witness :Mc~f urdie testifierl
there were no tire marks on the shoulder southwest of
the bridge (Tr. 404).
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If there were tire Inarks on the shoulder southwest
of the bridg-e, there is no way to tell what vehicle made
the marks. They could have been made by the car of
Lt. Day. He testified as follows:

"Q. As you drove up to the scene of the accident,
you then drove across the bridg-e and over onto the
shoulder and parked your car, didn't you t ''
"A. That's right." (Tr. 409). Lt. Day had been
traveling in the same direction as appellants' truck.
After parking his car on the right shoulder, he took
his car onto the bridge and approached the Moser car
from the south side of the bridge to throw his lights on
the Moser automobile (Tr. 306). As Lt. Day backed
onto the bridge, he could have made tire marks that
resembled dual tires; or any tire mark that appeared
on the shoulder could have been made by the numerous
cars that passed. Lt. Day testified several cars passed
the scene of the accident (Tr. 308).
Appellants claim that the tire marks of the truck
appear in unbroken continuity from the southwest corner of the bridge to the place where the truck came to
rest in the barrow pit 117 feet southwest of the bridge
(Tr. 324). If respondent's automobile had crossed the
roaa and collided with the truck, the force of the impact
would have made it impossible for the tire marks .of
the truck to appear in unbroken continuity. In fact, if
such had been the case, the truck would have been pushSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
ed off theLibrary
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Location of Debris

Appellants contend that the location of the debris
was where the accident occurred. This is particularly
interesting in view of the testirnony of 1\Ir. Reese that
there 1vasn 't anything to show definitely where the
accident happened.· (Tr. 354). Where was the debris?
:Mr. Reese testified that the majority of it was to the
right of the center line of the highway, going north (Tr.
354). He and Gray testified it was swept up by them
.and deposited on the east shoulder. On the other hand,
l\ir. l\fcMurdie testified that it was on the east side of
the highway (Tr. 274, 275), that it was scattered and
that it consisted of oil and battery plates (Tr. 282). Mr.
Haws likewise testified that there was a dark spot or
oil. pieces of battery plates, and scraps of different
parts of the car on the. east side of the highway (Tr.
289 290) and located the oil or blood spots on the pavernent near its east edge (Tr. 292). Mr. Blaine Moser also
testified as to battery plates and blood stains being on
the east side of the highway between two and four feet
from the east edge of the pavement (Tr. 195).
Regardless of what lVIr. Reese stated in regard to
cleaning up the debris, we know one cannot sweep away
oil or blood spots on a cement highway. Furthermore,
battery plates are thin, heavy and difficult to sweep
away. Mr. Reese stated that he swept away the majority
of it (Tr. 372). He did not testify he swept it all away.
vVhen l\fr. Reese was questioned concerning the location
of blood spots, he testified he ''wasn't interested in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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blood

~pots,

whether they wt:>re here or there." (Tr.

371).

Position of Respondent's Automobile
Appellants state on page 26 of their brief that the
position of respondent's automobile after the accident
shows the collision did not occur on respondent's side
of the highway. Lt. Day seemed more positive as to the
position of respondents car after the accident than
anyone else. Lt. Day testified that the car was 1n a
diagonal position, that its left front wheel "was not
over the center line of the highway more than one foot"
(Tr. 312, 313). He further testified that the "right rear
wheel was just about off, nearly off the road" (Tr. 316),
and that it was ''within about one foot of the edge of the
cement or pavement" (Tr. 317) on the east side of the
highway (Tr. 304). Once again we call attention to the
fact that Mr. Reese testified that there wasn't anything
to show definitely where the accident happened (Tr.
354).
Tire marks on the top of respondent's car clearly
appear fron1 Exhibits A and B. Mr. Moser identified
these tire marks on the top of his car (Tr. 192). Exhibit~
A, B and C disclose that the top of the Moser car was
pulled to the left of the direction in which it was traveling. Exhibits Band C further disclose that the right side
of the body of the Moser car, including its cowl, was
pulled to the left. These are physical facts which prove
that the left front end of the Moser car was pulled over
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Contrary to the claim of appellants, we submit that
the location of respondent's car after the collision is
conclusive evidence that in1mediately prior to the collision it was on its right side of the highway. Practically
the whole of that car was on the right side of the highway, and its having been pulled to the left is obvious.
Blaine Moser (Tr. 197, 198), Hickman (Tr. 231),
~fcMurdie (Tr. 278), and Haws (Tr. 290) all testified
that they saw tire marks leading from about the center
of the highway near the location of the debris thereon,
directly to where the truck went off the road. Appellants
clai.-rn that these witnesses were looking at tire marks
made by equipment in pulling the appellants' truck upright. There is no evidence to this effect. Appellants
next contend that because the truck finally landed
parallel to the highway it could not have gone off the
road at the angle the tire marks indicated, as testified
by these witnesses. A truck going about forty miles an
hour, out of control after a terrific collision, might
possibly come to rest in any position.
The sum and substance of appellants' argument
as to liability seems to be that while there is a conflict
in the evidence as to the negligence of appellants, none
of respondent's evidence should be considerd bcause
respondent shouldn't be believed and his witnesses'
testin1ony should be dislregarded because they were
Pither friends or relatives. Appellants tried this same
argument without success on the trial court and jury.
The evidence in this case discloses that the right
rear
wheel
of Library.
appellants'
truck
collided
with
theand north
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end of the bridge. Appellant Rogers clailns it didn't,
but the appellants' witness Reese said the north end
of the bridge had been hit (Tr. 364). Witness Haws
likewise testified (Tr. 289). l\Ir. l\1c~Iurdie testified to
the sante faet err. 272) and so did l\1r. Hickman err.
230). It is interesting to note that although appellant
Rogers testified his truck did not hit the north end of the
bridge, he made an investigation at that point (Tr. 327).
The record does not disclose why he made this investigation, or what he was looking for. We believe Mr.
Ro~gers actually did not know his truck hit the north
end of the bridge because we believe at that time he was
asleep. No one will ever know just why appellant's
truck hit the north end of the bridge, but we believe it
was because he was tired from his long day's work,
and dozed. At that point there was no need for him to
anticipate danger, and there is evidence that he did not
do so (Tr. 332). The bridge is 74 feet long, and the impact occurred 66 feet beyond the end of the bridge in
the direction Rogers was traveling (Tr. 196); both vehicles were traveling at approximately the same rate
of speed (Tr. 323) so at that particular moment the car
and truck were at least 280 feet apart. Appellant Rogers
admits he hit the rail of the bridge. The evidence is
without dispute that he also hit the post at the south
end of the bridge, and there is the point where he pulled
the truck sharply to the left, in order to get away from
the bridge, a natural, human reaction, and where he
pulled his truck suddenlly into the, left lane of the highway and directly into the path of the 0 ;.(~omhtg. autoSponsored
by the S.J.of
Quinney
Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
respondent.
mobile
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Had appellant Rogers stayed on the right hand side
of the road, the accident could never have happened.
Appellants claim the right tire marks of the truck showed clearly on the shoulder and there was no waive ring;
that they ran directly to where the truck went off the
highway. If that story is true, the Moser car would
have had to cross the entire highway and run into the
truck. The picture of respondent's automobile show the
great force of the collision (Exhibits A, B and C). Had
such a force collided with the truck, would its tire marks
appear in a straight line~ Of course they ·wouldn't!
There would have appeared on the shoulder a mark
which would have disclosed a. scraping of the surface
of the shoulder.
And moreover, if the collision occurred 30 feet south
of the bridge and on the west side of the highway, as
appellant testified, (Tr. 324) it is difficult to perceive
how the Moser car came to rest 66 feet south of the
bridge, and diagonally in the east lane of traffic with
the left front wheel about one foot over the center line,
(Tr. 312, 313), and equally difficult to understand how
Mrs. Moser, who was thrown onto the ground on the
east side of the car at the time of the collision. was
found lying partly on the east edge of the pavement
and partly on the east shoulder, 66 feet' south of the
bridge. (Tr. 211, 212, 213.) We submit that Roger's testirnony, when examined in the light of the foregoing uncontroverted physical facts comes within the rule laid
down by this ·court in Haarstrich vs. O.S.L., 70 Utah.
552,
262 Pac. 100.
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\Y ~ submit the evidenct> in this case is clear that
the collision occurred just as desci'ibed by respondent
and his wife, and that is that as respondent was driving
in his right lane of traffic the truck of appellants sud-;
denly swerved over in front of respondent's automobile,
and its left rear wheels ran over respondent's car.
Appellanlts assert that respondent testified he was
rendered unco~cious. Respondent did not so testify. He
testified he did not know what happened after the impact (Tr. 159). Dr. Hansen testified that in his opinion
respondent was not entirely unconscious; that he was
confused, and gave his reasons for such opinion, including the talk of respondent (Tr. 258, 259). Dr. Hansen
further testified that if unconsciousness is not complete
there is not necessarily a loss of memory of the events
preceeding the accident causing an injury (Tr. 260, 261).
Appellants then contend that because the memory of
respondent has been affected by this accident, he could
not remember the facts of the accident, and, therefore,
his testimony should be disregarded. Regardless of how
poor the ability of a man may be to remember faces or
names, certainly, so long as he has reasoning ability, he
would remember being hit by a truck.
Appellants assert that Mrs. ::Moser didn't know
what happened, claiming she was "at least partially
unconcious" and was hysterical (App. Brief 32). The
testimony .of Mrs. Moser omitted in the quotation on
page 32 of appellants' brief is: "My aunt called my
husband. I could see him motioning. My aunt got on her
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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She was asking me where I was. She came towards us,
and things were a little vague because I had a terrific
blow.''

Immediately following that testimony of Mrs.

!\loser is the following:
Q. Was that the last thing you remember~

A. No, my aunt spoke to Erwin. She came running
toward him. I said, 'How is
help you

up~'

Erwin'~

She said, 'Can I

I naturally wanted to see what was

going to take place, and I tried to get up, and fell back
do\\"'TI because of the impact, which made me very sick.
She said, ''Vhat is the idea, what is the idea~' I said.
'Go and get the number of the truck.' She went around
the side, and ~aid, 'Don't worry, that truck won't get
away--that will never get away'. And about that time-soon afterwards there was people gathered, and a man
came to where I was, and it seemed as if he was an
inspector. However, lots of people were coming toward
me, and he said he was a doctor. I said, 'What kind of
a doctor~' And he said he was an M.D. doctor, and he
made some inspection.
"My aunt came. It was--it was rather cold, and I
had my coat on, but I was lying in some water, in some
rain pool, possibly, where I was lying, and she took off
her coat and put it over me. She thought I would be
cold. Then sometime after someone there was going to
telephone, and they put us on a stretcher and took us
to the hospital.
0. Now, did you make any inspection of the scene
of the night?
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A. 1 was lying there, and I could see on all sides of
me. I was lying on the road.

Q. Approxinmtely where on the road were you
lying~

A. l was l)ing over near the east side of the road.
Q. Can you tell us approximately, in feet or

inches, how far frmn the east side of the

1n

road~

A. 'Veil, my head. stuck off the pavement on the
east side of the road. ~fy head was off the pavement.
(Tr. 211, 212)

NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
One of the strangest arguments we have ever heard
is that respondent concealed the fact of a previous injury.
This shows how desperate appellants are. What do they
mean by ''conceahnent''~ We suppose they mean that
although respondent was left permanently and severely
injured by this accident, in fact a shell of a man, he
should voluntarily have said to the jury "I think you
shouldn't allow as much damages as you otherwise
would, because five years ago I sprained my ankle and
knee, which were completely cured before this accident.''
Respondent's deposition was taken by appellants, and
he was cross examined by them. At no time did appellants ask him about any prior accidents or injuries. If
a plaintiff were required to divulge such information,
a defendant would never ask about prior injuries purposely in order to obtain a new trial. It is reasonable
to assume that respondent never once thought of his
skiing
accident
because
average
person
would
notServices
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Coum;el for appellant state they first learned of the
alleged newly .liscovered evidence on September 20, 1946,
the day after the conclusion of the trial, and of the
balance of it on about September 30, 1946. There is no
showing \vhatsoever of any diJiigence on the part of the
appellants to discover this evidence prior to the trial.
Vve submit that the counter-affidavits filed in opposition to the motion for a new trial was a complete
answer to the affidavits in support of that motion, and
that under no conceivable circumstance would the newly
discovered evidence have been likely to change the
result of the trial. The counter-affidavits disclose that
respondent had completely recovered from the injuries
suffered in his skiing accident on December 26, 1941.
In fact, the affidavit of Albert R. Bowen discloses that
the file of North American Insurance Company, which
was examined by him, recites that recovery from the
injuries received from the skiing accident"would not
be complete for an additional thirty days from April
22, 1942". The affidavits of W. E. McMurdis, of Dr.
Hanson, of 1Iaurice M. ~Iarler, of Mrs. Moser, and of
respondent himself, all are to the effect that there was
no permanent injury sustained by respondent from
said skiing accident. And Dr. Hanson states in his
affidavit that there is no relationship between the injury
to the knee and ankle suffered on December 26, 1941.
and the injury to the left leg suffered on October 10,
1945. The fact that the Insurance Company endorsed
on its policy an exclusion of liability for future injuries
which respondent might sustain to his left knee and
ankle, upon the ground that said knee and ankle were
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permanently hupaired, is absolutely iininaterial.

It is

cominon knowledge that insurance cmnpanies always
do that; and it i~ surprising that the cmnpany did not
Cc~nrcl his policy, as Inost accident insurance cmnpanies
are wont to do after payn1ent of one loss.
The statement of C. A. Thomas, an insurance man,
that respondent dmnonstrated his ability to flex and
use his knee and ankle, could not be believed by the
Court, because the Court saw the condition of the knee
and ankle at the time of trial, and could see as anyon~
would that even at that time it would be impossible for
respondent to use and flex his ankle and knee in an
~rdinary

manner.

The affadavits filed on behalf of respondent show
that prior to the happening of the accident involved in
this case, respondent had no· apparent disability of any
kind, and that he worked and played as a normal individual. In view of this evidence, certainly the fact
that five years prior to the happening of this accident.
respondent had sprained his anlde and knee and would
have been most unlikely to have changed the result of
the trial, and particularly in view of the extremely
severe injuries suffered by hiln in addition to the injuries to his knee and ankle.
Appella;nts also claim that about three weeks before the ~~~:.~nt, respondent was injured in a bus accident. The affidavit filed by respondent himself is a
complete answer to this. Respondent set forth in his
affidavit that he was in no way incapacitated by that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Uailroad Company, the o\vner of the bus, the sum of
$150.00 in full settlement of any claim that he might
make. As pointed out in the affidavit of respondent, the
$150.00 was paid to him to buy a new suit of clothes and
to pay hin1 for the inconvenience he had sustained by
reason of said accident. A fellow passenger on the bu::;
had bled on respondent's suit, which was the only damage he had sustained in that accident. We submit that
the fact that respondent was in the bus accident certainly would not have been likely to have changed the
results of the trial in this case.
On page 21 of appellants' brief, in discussing the
question of newly discovered evidence, counsel have the
following to say:
''In general it may be said that four eleJnents, if found to exist, are sufficient to support
a new trial based upon a showing of such evidence. Those elements are: (1) diligence in securing the evidence before trial; (2 and 3) that
such evidence is more than cumulative and impeaching in its effect; and ( 4) that it is material
and likely to change the result."
The following Utah cases are cited by appellant as
having accepted the foregoing principles:
"Klopenstine vs. Haws, 20 Utah 45; Trimble
vs. Union Pacific Stages, 105 Utah 457, 142 Pac.
2d 67 4; Jensen vs. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 57
Pac. 2d 708; Van Dyke vs. Ogden Savings Bank,
48 Utah 606, 161 Pac. 50.''
From an examination of the decisions rendered in
the foregoing cases, it will be seen that all of those
cases are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the rase of KJopenstine

v~.

Hays, supra, the trial

court denied a nwtion for new trial, and upon appeal to
this court the ruling of the trial court was sustained,
on the ground as stated in the opinion:
•'rrhe facts presented in this affidavit, if
true, would tend to iinpeach and contradict the
testin1ony of the plaintiff. In some respects the
testimony is cumulative, and no reason is shown
why with reasonable diligence the witness Lamb
could not have been produced at the trial."
In the ca;:;e of Trimble vs. Union Pacific Stages,
supra, the jury returned a verdict of no cause of action,
and· the plaintiff made a motion for new trial, which
was denied by the trial court. In holding that the lower
court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion , this
Court said:
''Nor do we believe that the lower court
erred in refusing to grant a new trial. The evidence of witnesses Hess and Halahan was cumulative, and it is well sP-ttled in this state that such
evidenee is not ground for a new trial.''
In the case of Jensen vs. Logan City. supra, the
jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant, no cause
of action, and the trial court denied plaintiff's motion
for a new trial. The plaintiff supported his motion for
a new trial with two affidavits, and in holding that the
evidence set forth in these affidavits, if true, was
material and entitled him to a new trial, this Court
said:
"The two affidavits of H. W. Jeppson and
Donna Lundberg reveal testimony which the
plaintiff should have the benefit of. Miss Lund-
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bern·
on the evenin;:,cr of March 18th, the night of
'b
the accident, while walking on the paved portion,
tripped on the wire and lost her balance. Jeppson
on March 7th pushed up the wire which was
projecting 18 inches on the pavement and laid it
clear of the pavement and then notified Mr.
Nyrnan. * * * * If 1Iiss Lundberg testified as
stated in her affidavit, it will throw a light on
the case which heretofore did not play upon it.
Jeppson's testimony would be quite positive of
the ability of the loose fence end to extend onto
the pavement. Where disinterested testimony on
the vital point in a case is very scant, newly
discovered testimony on that point to be apparently reliable, when it appears that the movant
for the new trial was not guilty of indiligence in
failing to obtain the witness for the trial. and
that there is no element of holding such witness
in reserve for purposes of obtaining a new trial
-generally picturesquely denominated in slang
phraseology as 'an ace in the hole'-and it appears likely that such evidence would change the
result, a new trial should be granted.''
And although this Court held in the Jensen case that
the newly diseovered evidence was material and was not
merely cumulative, yet it recognized the well settled
rule which should govern the Courts when called upon
to rule on a motion for a new trial :
'' 'It is only under very special circumstances, because of the quality or type of proposed evidence and where it makes clear a fact
which was formerly in doubt that new trials are
granted to allow the defeated party to add cumulative evidence, newly discovered, and then only
where there is a clear probability that the result
of a ne·w trial will be different.' '' (Italics supplied.)
·
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respe(~tfully

sub1nit that in the case of Van

Ogden Savings Bank, supra, the question in-

vo1Yl'd on the 1notion for new trial was not so much
newly discoYPrPd evidence as it was the refusal of the
defendant to give plaintiff access to certain bank checks
which were clain1ed to be forgeries, so that the plaintiff could photograph the checks and enlarge them to
enable her handwriting experts to make a more thorough study of the signatures upon the checks, to more
definitely determine whether they were foi_'geries.
It was conceded that the defendant and its counsel
refused plaintiff's demand for access to said checks
prior to the trial in the lower ?ourt, and that after the
trial was concluded and the verdict went in favor of
the defendant. the plaintiff caused a special action to be
instituted to gain access to the checks. The enlarged
photographs of the checks were attached to the affidavits in support of plaintiff's n1otion for new trial
and rp.ad~ a part thereof. This Court held that the plaintiff should have had access to said checks prior to the
trial in order to develop her case in support of her contention that her former husband had forged her signature to said checks ; and being denied this right in
the trial court, she had not been accorded a fair trial.
On page 23 of appellant's brief, counsel made the
following statement:
"When a verdict is against the great weight
of the evidence it is the trial court's right and
duty to set the verdict aside and grant a new
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In support of the foregoing statement, counsel cites
the Utah case of Valiotis vs. Utah-Apex ~1:ining Company, 55 Utah 1~1, 194 Pac. 802. It is respectfully submitted that the decision of this Court in the Valiotis
case is an ahsolute authority for the ruling of the trial
Court in denying defendant's motion for a new trial
in the case at bar. In that case the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff, supported by substantial evidence. And the trial Court denied the defendant's
motion for a new trial. which ruling was affinned by
this Court. In reviewing the evidence in that case, this
Court said:
''While the evidence on the part of the defendant, consisting of the testimony of seven
witnesses. tended strongly to prove that the
ladder in question was in sound condition at the
time of the accident, • "" * it was not conclusive.
Not only the testimony of the plaintiff, but
the testimony of three other witnesses produced
in his behalf, equally positive and more direct,
tended to prove that plaintiff's fall and consequent injury was caused by a loose rung which
gave ·way as plaintiff stepped on it. Reasonably
certain it is that if the rung gave way as plaintiff
stepped upon it, and caused him to fall, as he
testified. the rung was loose and insecure at that
time.'' And this Court held that there was a substantial
conflict of the evidence, and sustained the trial court's
ruling in denying the motion for new trial, using the
following language :
"Therefore, so far as the soundness of the
ladder, or the l~eness of the rung, and the resulting injury to plaintiff, is concerned, there
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was a substantial conflict of evidence which required the jury to weigh the conflicting evidence
and the credibility of the witnesses who testified
thereto and determine the question of fact thus
presented. In view of the verdict of the jury and
the trial court's ruling on motion for new trial,
that question of fact must be resolved against
the appellant and in favor of the trial court's
ruling."
On page 25 of [!,ppellant 's brief, the following contention is made :
''The evidence of plaintiff and his witnesses. when examined in the light of the uncontroverted physical facts, could not be true. The two
could not have co-existence. It is our contention
that statements which fly in the face of established physical fact must be disregarded as evidence.''
The case of Haarstrich v. 0. S. L., 70 Utah 552, 262
Pac. 100, is cited in support of the above rule. Although
the rule was properly applied in that case, it will be
seen that the rule contended for by appellant does not
apply to plaintiff's evidence in the instant case, as will
be noted from the following quotation from the Haarstrich case :
''The jury found. in answer to special interrogatories that the speed of the automobile in
approaching the crossing was between 25 and
30 miles an hour while the speed of defendant's
car was between 5 and 6 miles an hour. The driver
of the automobile appeared to be an experienced
driver, and testified that at a speed of 30 miles
an hour he could have stopped his car within
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premises above stated it appears that from the
tin1e defendant's car entered upon the highway
until it collided with the automobile, the front
end of the car had reached a point 24 or 25 feet
beyond, making in all at least 42 feet which the
car had moved after entering upon the highway.
The decisive question therefore is, At what point
on the highway was the automobile when the
defendant's car entered upon the paved highway!
No matter whether the automobile was moving
at 25 or 30 miles an hour or whether defendant's
car was moving at 5 or 6 miles an hour, it is quite
conclusive that the aut01nobile was moving five
times as fast as was the car of defendant. So
that if defendant's car moved 42 feet from the
time it entered upon the highway until it was
struck, the automobile must have been five times
that distance north of the crossing when defendant's car entered upon the highway, or 210 feet,
which is five times the distance within which
the driver of the automobile, according to his
own testimony, could have stopped his automobile and avoided the collision.''
L

Instructions

Appellants claim the Court erred In refusing to
give their requested Instruction No. 1, which reads as
follows:
''You are instructed that defendants are not
required to explain how or why the collision involved in this case occurred. The burden is upon
the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of all
of the evidence that the collision resulted from
the negligence of defendant." (R. 33).
That instruction was covered entirely by Instruetions as given. Instruction No. 4 specifically covered
the burden of proof, as follows :
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··The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence, as that term
i~ herinafter defined, the allegations of said
emnplaint, a8 the srune are set forth in Instruction No. 2. ''
Instruction No. 9, as given. covers the first senret{"esteP
tence of tlw "f·equirQc;l instruction. Instruction 9 is as
follows:
•• Yon are instructed that the mere fact· that
an accident happened, or that plaintiff was injured, constitutes no proof of negligence against
the defendants.,.,
Instruction No. 10 likewise covers requested Instruction No. 1, which was refused .. That instruction,
in part, is as follows :
''In order for you to find· a verdict for the
plaintiff, you must believe {rom a preponderance
of the evidence; first, that the defendants were
negligent in one or more of the particulars alleged by the plaintiff in his said complaint, as set
forth in Instruction No. 2; • • • ''
CONCLUSION
The record in this case discloses that the accident
occurred because appellant Rogers lost control of the
truck he was driving, struck the bridge. and in attempting to get his truck away from the bridge rail, suddenly
pulled it to his left and then to his right, causing its rear
end to be whipped around in front of respondent's oncoming automobile, into respondent's lane of traffic,
and in collision with respondent's car.
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24
conflict in the testimony as to which driver was at fault"
(App. Brief, p. 2).and then attempt to discredit every
witness of respondent. In this they have failed and the
record discloses the reason why.
rrhe appellants' motion for a new trial was properly denied by the trial Court. There ·was no showing of
diligence on the part of appellants to discover the alleged newly discovered evidence and that evidence was
not material and would not have changed the result of
the trial.
The trial Court instructed the jury as requested by
appellants, and they had a fair trial. They now want
to try this case over again, but they have failed to show
any reason why they should be granted such a right.
For the foregoing reasons respondent respectfully
submits that the verdict in this case should be sustained
and the judgment of the trial Court affirmed.
Respectfully Submitted,

L.E.NELSON
SAMUEL J. CARTER
Attorneys for Plaintiff -and Respondent
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